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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse, firstly, to what extent intangible assets in the 
consolidated accounts of seven Portuguese banks and seven Spanish banks between 2006 and 
2009 are disclosed and, secondly, to analyse what the most influential factors are in the above 
mentioned disclosure.  
In order to do this, before reviewing the existing literature and on the basis of other studies on 
this topic, a disclosure index has been created based on the requirements related to the 
intangible assets as stated in IAS 38. Then, two statistical analyses have been made: a 
univariate one for each of the explanatory variables and a multivariate one, in which all 
variables have been analysed. Both analyses led to the conclusion that the disclosure index of 
intangible assets is 0.96, where the bank dimension and the internationalization degree are 
the variables that are considered explanatory of the variation of the disclosure index in the 
regression analysis. 
Keywords: Intangible assets, disclosure index, financial institutions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Market globalisation, the evolution of information and communication technologies and the 
changes in regulations have resulted in dramatic changes in the banking sector in the last 
decade with structural and technological advances that make top management rethink their 
business strategies (Cabrita e Bontis, 2008). 
This paper deals with the analysis of the consolidated financial statements of Spanish and 
Portuguese banks to verify the compliance with the requirements of disclosure demanded by 
accounting rules on intangible assets held by these institutions. In order to do this, a disclosure 
index was created based on disclosure requirements as stated in IAS 38 – Intangible assets and 
by means of the content analysis technique, information was collected and the financial 
statements of seven Portuguese banks and seven Spanish banks in the period from 2006 to 
2009 (56 tests) were analysed. 
For the preparation of this paper, we have defined two main objectives. The first aim is to 
ascertain the extent of disclosure of intangible assets by banks in the Iberian Peninsula. For the 
second, we try to determine the most influential factors in this disclosure. 
This paper starts by identifying the main theories associated with this problem, followed by 
the definition of the dependent and independent variables selected. In the analysis of results, 
we present the descriptive statistics of the variables under study, followed by a univariate 
analysis for each of the explanatory variables. This is complemented by a multivariate analysis, 
where all variables are analysed together with the intent to conclude the existence or not of a 
linear association between the disclosure index created and the explanatory variables 
considered in our study. 
We end by presenting our main conclusions. 
 
2. REVIEW OF THE THEORIES APPLIED IN THE DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING 
The disclosure of accounting information is based on social and politic theories. The Positive 
Accounting Theory comes from several empirical studies of the economic reality and 
accounting regulations. Business costs arise from relations with the market, from internal 
business connections (contractual costs) and also those associated with political decisions 
(political costs). These costs are specifically transaction costs, agency costs, information costs, 
renegotiation costs, and bankruptcy costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
The legitimacy theory, which emerged from the political process, argues that companies 
operate within certain rules and standards in relation to society, with an implicit social 
contract. The regulatory bodies have the legitimacy to act, conditioning the business 
behaviours to regulations issued by the various economic agents. The failure to comply with 
these regulations makes those companies incur in political costs (or adjustment costs) and 
costs of asymmetry of information. Thus the company may have the incentive to disclose 
information to minimize these costs. One of the determinants analysed in our study related to 
the legitimacy theory is visibility, which is a measure of the organisation size, profitability and 
internationalisation. 
The stakeholders’ theory argues that there is an organisational responsibility in the disclosure 
of corporate information for stakeholders concerning the most important activities, being the 
main source of disclosure through financial statements. In this respect, Rodrigues (2006) 
considers that, due to the complexity of the economic reality and to the increasing ownership 
of intangible assets by groups, these statements continually detour from the purpose of 
providing the external users with the picture of the business reality. The content analysis of 
corporate reports by several stakeholders justifies the importance of this theory in our study 
(Guthrie et al., 2006). 
In the context of economic theories, we wish to highlight the agency theory. According to 
Quevedo (2003:12) ‘the agency theory proposes conceptual tools necessary to analyse each of 
the relationships that take place within the corporate contractual patchwork.’ According to the 
author, the agency theory is the essence of banking in general, because the information is 
essential in order to choose between the different alternatives offered by market. This theory 
is based on the relationship between the management bodies and the capital holders. In this 
context, we believe that there could be larger problems of agency when the capital of an 
organisation is held mainly by private shareholders, because they will have greater incentives 
to not disclose the information than in those organisations whose capital belongs essentially to 
public institutions. 
In the light of these theoretical evidences, we try to verify to what extent intangible assets are 
disclosed by banks in the Iberian Peninsula and to determine the most influential factors in this 
disclosure. 
For this purpose, we have decided to carry out the following empirical study. 
 
 
3. VARIABLES USED 
As for the variables used, firstly we will describe the dependent variable in this paper and then 
we will look at the independent variables considered appropriate for the development of this 
study. 
 3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In this paper we have tried to produce a disclosure index of intangible assets in the financial 
statements of some banking institutions in the Iberian Peninsula, taking as a reference the 
disclosure requirements stated in IAS 38. The dichotomic procedure was used, where the value 
1 was given if the bank discloses the issue in question and value 0, if it does not. The score 
given to each item that composes the disclosure index is additive.  
We share Cooke’s idea (1989) in which those companies that disclose the most important 
items also disclose the least important ones. According to this author, the disclosure index of 
those companies that do not disclose non-relevant items should not be penalised, arguing that 
if their report does not mention the disclosure of an item, it is concluded that this item was 
not relevant to the company in that period. In the same way, if an item considered relevant 
was not disclosed (for example reporting owning a specific item but not disclosing its amount), 
it is clearly considered that there was no disclosure. 
In the same way, in our study we consider that the items are not-relevant or not applicable if 
the bank refers clearly that it does not own that element or, by the information collected, it is 
presumed that the element does not exist. In case the possession (or application) of a certain 
element is reported in the financial statements and the disclosure requirements about this 
element are not satisfied, the item is considered not to be disclosed or applicable. As an 
example, we mentioned the fact that a bank does not have intangible assets developed 
internally, which correspond to 16 items (out of 45) in our disclosure index. Since it is 
considered that those intangible assets were not disclosed the disclosure index of that bank 
would be penalised (since those items are not applied to that bank). If those items are 
excluded from the calculation of the index, because they are not applicable in this particular 
situation, the disclosure index is higher and the disclosure only the bank intangible assets 
disclosed are considered. 
Thus, the disclosure index is calculated for the application of the above mentioned by 
calculating the score of those elements disclosed or of those elements applicable (or relevant, 
according to Cook, 1989), and the disclosure indexes obtained by these scores are as follows: 
 
• Score of intangible assets disclosed: 
 
 
Where: 
D Score of disclosure of intangible assets according to IAS 38 
ei Disclosed element concerning the intangible asset i being analysed 
Dichotomic variable that takes the value 0, if element i is not disclosed, and the 
value 1, if the element i is disclosed 
m Maximum number of elements disclosed (m ≤ n) 
 
• Score of intangible assets applicable (or relevant) 
 
Where: 
A Disclosure score of applicable (or relevant) intangible assets  
ei Disclosed element concerning the intangible asset i in analysis 
Dichotomic variable that takes the value 0, if element i is not disclosed, and the 
value 1, if the element i is disclosed 
m Maximum number of applicable (or relevant) elements n ≤ 45 
 
• Disclosure index according to IAS 38 (DIV 38) 
 
This index indicates only the presence/disclosure of information on a specific item in the 
Annual Report and Accounts, but does not analyse the disclosure extension/quality of a 
specific item. The relationship between the dependent variable (DIV 38) and the independent 
variables (SIZE, PROF, PIBA, CLA, INT, PRIV) has been analysed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Independent variables in this study 
Source: personal compilation 
As previously mentioned, we must emphasize that this index was based on the disclosure 
requirements that are stated as compulsory in IAS 38 from the IASB 
3.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES TESTS 
We will describe the independent variables used in this study, together with the formulation of 
the hypotheses associated with them. 
SIZE (SIZE) 
The size of the reported institution is the most used variable in the studies about disclosure 
determinants and in most the studies, it explains the variability of the disclosures. Disclosure 
costs and benefits vary according to the influence of a series of key factors (Gallery et. al., 
2008): 
Size as a measure of political and public visibility 
Size is the proxy variable in political attention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Larger societies 
are subject to greater regulation, therefore suffering greater political pressure, and thus, 
increasing disclosure in order to reduce political costs (Gómez n/a; White et. al., 2007). 
Large companies attract greater interest or public visibility (Gerpott et. al., 2008; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008) for users of financial statements, mainly investors and government entities 
(Oliveira et. al., 2006; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). For this reason, larger companies will also 
have a greater concern with the implicit and explicit costs resulting from disputes that may 
arise from lower-quality information disclosure (Gallery et. al., 2008). Size also influences the 
external perception of the societies reputation, since stakeholders’ attention is attracted by 
larger companies, their disclosed information will be, in principle, more reliable and will have a 
more adequate recovery (Gómez, n/a; Quevedo, 2003; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). 
Size associated with the production of information 
Large companies usually incur in lower costs of production of information than small ones, 
because they use more sophisticated information systems, which allows to disclose more 
information and more transparent information (Gandía, 2003; Oliveira et. al., 2006; Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007; Gerpott et. al., 2008; Gallery et. al., 2008; Liu and Sun, 2010). 
Size associated with competitive advantages 
As a rule, larger companies will have greater competitive advantages. The disclosure of their 
intangible assets can be a source of obtaining additional advantages because these elements 
may differentiate a company from its competitors (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). 
This variable has been measured in different ways in studies on intangible assets disclosure: 
• Market capitalisation (Gandía, 2003; García-Meca and Martínez, 2005; Guthrie et. al., 
2006; White et. al., 2007);  
• Value of sales (Li et. al., 2008) 
• Number of employees (Boesso e Kumar, 2007; Serenko et. al., 2007) 
• Total assets (Gómez, n/a) 
• Logarithm of the asset value (Cormier et. al., 2009: Brüggen et. al., 2009)1. 
• Market share (Deephouse, 1997) 
Some authors combine measures to define size: 
• Total assets, turnover, number of employees and market value (Oliveira et. al., 2006); 
• Turnover and number of employees (Gerpott et. al., 2008) 
In most of the above mentioned studies, the hypothesis of a statistically significant, positive 
association between the company size and the information disclosure of intangibles assets is 
confirmed. Thus we formulate the first hypothesis in this study: 
H1 – There is a positive relationship between the bank size and the disclosure of intangible 
assets in its financial statements. 
PROFITABILITY (PROF) 
The argument that the most profitable companies comparatively disclose more information, 
leads to the economic performance usually be one of the factors most commonly used in the 
studies on disclosure determinants.  
Profitability is usually measured in the studies on the disclosure of intangible assets by the 
following aspects: 
• Return on assets (ROA) (Oliveira et. al., 2006; Li et. al., 2008; Cormier et. al., 2009); 
• Return on equity (ROE) (García-Meca and Martínez, 2005) 
Some authors have analysed profitability by combining several metrics in order to analyse the 
association of the variable in the disclosure of the intangible assets: Gerpott et. al. (2008) 
based themselves on four criteria (Price to Earnings ratio (P/E); Market-to-book ratio; Tobin’s 
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 The asset value was also applied in our study as a measure for the organisation size, although subject 
to a prior logarithmic transformation in order to normalise the distribution of the variables. 
q, EBITDA). There is no consensus in the results of the association of this variable with the 
disclosure of intangible assets. Although some studies have confirmed a positive association 
(García-Meca and Martínez, 2005; Li et. al., 2008), this was not proved to be so in others 
(Oliveira et. al., 2006). Thus, we form our second hypothesis by associating the bank 
profitability with its disclosure index. Due to the diversity of results in the studies on this topic, 
we will not start from the premise of orientation of the variation. 
H2 – The disclosure index of the intangible assets varies with the bank profitability, although 
the direction of this variation cannot be predicted 
PERCENTAGE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS (PIBA) 
With this variable we try to study if a greater percentage in investments in intangible assets 
reported in the financial statements over total assets of an institution encourages greater 
disclosure. Boesso and Kumar (2007) defend the strengthening of partnerships with various 
stakeholder groups through greater transparency about the performance and the presence of 
intangible assets. The association of the investment intensity in intangible assets with 
profitability is described by Gandía’s study (2003), in which this investment was used as a 
proxy for the profitability and where a significant association was confirmed. Ollier et. al. 
(2010) also used the intensity ratio as an explanatory variable of the disclosure of intangible 
assets. This metric was the result of the percentage of intangible assets over non-current 
assets. In our study we try to analyse whether the investment intensity in intangible assets is a 
variable that determines information disclosure: 
H3 – Those banks with the largest value of intangible assets accounted in their balance sheets 
show a higher disclosure index. 
CLASSES OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS (CLA) 
IAS 38 paragraph 118 establishes that companies must disclose their intangible assets grouped 
by classes, defining a class of intangible assets as a group of assets of a similar nature and use 
in the operations of an institution (paragraph 119). We try to complement the investment 
intensity level in intangible assets with the level of diversity. Therefore, in order to study the 
disclosure of intangible assets in the banks analysed, we believe that a greater diversity of 
intangible assets can lead to a greater disclosure since a greater number of classes of 
intangible assets could promote and provide wider and more varied information about them. 
On the basis of this evidence our fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
H4 – The larger the number of intangible assets a bank presents, the greater is the disclosure of 
intangible assets. 
INTERNATIONALISATION LEVEL (INT) 
As Quevedo (2003), we believe that the extent of the geographical area where the institution 
develops its activity is linked to its competitive position and that internationalisation causes a 
greater interest and attention on the actions of these institutions since they are 
observed/controlled by a greater number of interested parties. Oliveira et. al. (2006) and 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) also confirmed that there was a significant association (although 
for voluntary disclosure) with the value of exports as a proxy for their internationalisation 
level. 
In our study, the variable internationalisation level was measured in terms of the number of 
countries where companies included in the consolidated accounting requirements for each 
bank analysed are located. Thus, taking into account the studies carried out, the largest 
disclosure index of intangible assets is expected in those banks that are more 
internationalised.  
H5- The disclosure of intangible assets is greater in banks with a higher internationalisation 
level. 
NATURE OF THE CONTROL: PRIVATE (PRIV) VS. PUBLIC 
We intend to analyse whether the type of control (private vs. public) affects the degree of 
disclosure of extent of intangible assets. The paper by Liu and Sun (2010) about the quality of 
disclosure according to the nature of the control holders concluded that it is greater in 
institutions controlled by public bodies than by private institutions. We have formulated the 
following hypothesis based on this observation. 
H6 – There is a negative relationship between the private property control and the disclosure of 
intangible assets. 
Several authors have analysed the disclosure on the basis of geographical location, especially 
when it is very diverse, not only in terms of geography, but also in cultural, social and 
regulatory terms2. 
The aim of our study is to analyse the disclosure of intangible assets in the consolidated 
accounts of Spanish and Portuguese banks. Besides not finding no substantial differences in 
the above-mentioned factors, many of the banks examined are installed in both countries, and 
some of them are even the largest institutions in the market (e.g. the impact of Spanish banks 
such as Santander, Popular and BBVA on the Portuguese market). Therefore although we do 
not consider the geographical area as a determining factor for the disclosure of intangible 
assets, we will analyse these variables separately for Portugal and Spain in this paper. 
4. STATISTICAL MODELS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This study analyses a sample of Portuguese and Spanish banks that present consolidated 
accounts according to International Accounting Standards in the following four years: 2006-
2009. This sample is composed of seven banks in each country (which represents about 64% of 
the banks in Spain and about 54% in Portugal) the selected banks represent those having the 
Report and the consolidated accounts of the period examined in their web site. Some banks 
were rejected so that we could study the same number of banks in each country. As a result, a 
total of seven banks in each country were considered. 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
                                                           
2
 See Gómez (a/d); Gandía (2003); Gerpott et. al. (2008); Brännström and Giuliani (2009); Crawford and 
Williams (2010); Saleh et. al. (2010) 
Below we will describe the descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables that distinguish 
the sample in question and, on the basis of the Probability theory, we will try to analyse, 
interpret and carry out the possible statistic inference on the population (Santos, 2007). 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IAS 38 disclosure index (DIV38) 56 0.9601 0.0591 0.7895 1 
Bank size 56 7.7547 0.5963 6.492 9.046 
Profitability  56 12.0705 5.2726 3.05 22.96 
Percentage of intangibles in the balance sheet 56 0.497 0.5888 0.01 2.31 
Classes of intangible assets that the bank showed 56 3.18 1.416 1 7 
Internationalisation level 56 8.41 8.197 0 28 
 
As for the dummy variable included in this study, we found that the average private property 
control is 85.71% and that the public property control is 14.29%, which represents within the 
banks analysed and the data collected from them for both Portuguese banks and Spanish 
banks, only one public bank versus six private banks.  
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables by countries 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IAS 38 disclosure index – Portugal (DIV38P) 28 0.9388 0.0725 0.7895 1 
IAS 38 disclosure index  – Spain (DIV38E) 28 0.9814 0.0303 0.9 1 
Bank size - Portugal 28 7.4811 0.494 6.492 8.083 
Bank size - Spain 28 8.0282 0.5702 7.353 9.046 
Profitability - Portugal 28 9.61 4.8671 3.05 18.64 
Profitability - Spain 28 14.5311 4.5149 6.37 22.96 
Percentage of intangibles in the  balance sheet - Portugal 28 0.2536 0.2529 0.01 0.93 
Percentage of intangibles in the balance sheet - Spain 28 0.7404 0.7207 0.01 2.31 
Classes of intangible assets shown by the bank - Portugal 28 3.5 1.072 1 5 
Classes of intangible assets shown by the bank - Spain 28 2.86 1.649 1 7 
Internationalisation level - Portugal 28 7.14 4.453 1 14 
Internationalisation level - Spain 28 9.68 10.663 0 28 
 
The following conclusions can be obtained from the previous tables: 
• The average compliance with the disclosure of the items required by IAS 38 (DIV38) in 
the consolidated accounts of the Spanish and Portuguese banks in the period 2006 to 
2009 was 0.9601. The index is slightly different comparing Portugal and Spain, since 
Spanish banks disclosed more information about the intangible assets (Table 3). 
• The variable Bank size has an average value in the sample of 7.7547 (Table 2). There is 
superiority in the size of Spanish banks as opposed to Portuguese banks. 
• The profitability index reaches an average of 12.0705 (Table 2). With regard to the 
analysis by countries, it is clear that the Spanish banks have on average a higher 
profitability index than the Portuguese banks. 
• The variable that measures the percentage of the intangible assets in the balance 
sheet structure represents the fraction of the net value of intangible assets over total 
assets. In Table 2 we can see that the average value is 0.497. Although it is true that 
the percentage of intangible assets in Spanish banks is higher than that in Portuguese 
banks, the figures presented reflect the low investment in intangible assets presenting 
conditions able to be accounted for in the Balance Sheet in accordance with the 
requirements set out in IAS 38, in both countries (Table 3). 
• The number of classes of intangible assets considered by the bank is meant to 
represent the diversity of intangible assets, i.e. the grouping of assets of similar nature 
and use (IAS 38: §119). The average number of disclosed classes in both countries is 
3.18 (Table 2), although the Portuguese banks show the highest average of number of 
classes used (Table 3). 
• The internationalisation extent is 8.41. Meaning that, on average, each bank has 
companies included in the consolidation in 8 different countries (Table 2). Comparing 
Portugal and Spain, the Spanish banks have a higher internationalisation degree (Table 
3). 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS 
In order to verify whether the variable (private/public) property control is statistically 
significant with the index DIV38, we proceeded with the Mann-Whitney test, which allowed us 
to verify that the average disclosure in those banks whose control is public is 41.00, and it was 
only found in 8 cases (2 banks in 4 years). The average disclosure of index DIV38 for those 
banks whose control is private is 26.42, achieving the same result in the other 48 tests. The 
test is statistically significant (p=0.018) for a level of error of 0.05, which allows us to state that 
public control institutions disclose more than private ones, and confirms the Liu and Sun’s 
conclusions (2010) and the association of this difference with the agency theory previously 
described.  
Table 4 – Mann-Whitney test for the variable Property control 
 
 
Table 5 – Mann-Whitney test for the variable Property control by country 
 
By analysing the disclosure index for each country on the basis of the variable Property control 
(private/public) we have gained significance in the data for Portugal, which allows us to say 
that the Portuguese banks whose property control is public discloses significantly more than 
those Portuguese banks whose control is private. In the case of Spain, the bank whose 
property control is public also shows a higher average disclosure than those banks whose 
control is private, although the test is not statistically significant.  
In order to determine the degree of intensify of association between variables, the dependent 
variable (DIV38) was analysed in relation to the quantitative explanatory variables (SIZE, PROF, 
PIBA, CLA and INT). Since the sample size is higher than 30 tests for each variable in question, 
we applied the Correlation Coefficient or Pearson’s r3. 
Table 6 – Pearson Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
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 This coefficient measures the contribution that an independent variable has on the variation of the 
dependent variable controlling (cancelling) the effects of other variables that have an influence on the 
relationship (Pestana and Gageiro, 2003). This coefficient ranges from -100% to 100% and the greater 
the proximity to these extremes, the greater the linear association between variables, i.e., the intensity 
of one of them is accompanied by the intensity of the other. The proximity to zero means the absence of 
correlation, i.e., a causal relationship between the variables does not exist or cannot be determined. 
We can make the following conclusions from data in Table 6: 
• The correlation between the disclosure index (DIV38) and the bank internationalisation 
degree (INT), the percentage of intangible assets in the balance sheet structure (PIBA), 
the number of classes of intangible assets that the bank has disclosed (CLA) and the 
bank profitability (PROF) show a very weak and positive linear association between the 
variables, which are not statistically significant for a margin of error of 0.05 (p>α) and 
it could not be concluded that the DIV38 is influenced by the variables INT, PIBA, CLA 
and PROF. 
• The correlation between the disclosure index (DIV38) and the bank size (SIZE) shows a 
weak (42.3%) and positive linear association between them (Pearson’s r = 0.423; p = 
0.001) with p<α, i.e., the hypothesis that the association between these variables is 
significant is accepted. The coefficient of determination is 17.89%, this figure indicates 
the proportion of influence of the variable size on the disclosure index, and it is to be 
expected that the larger the bank is, the greater the disclosure index of its intangible 
assets will be. 
Analysing the sample per group of countries, we have used the Spearman’s rho Correlation 
Coefficient4 in order to study the association between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables. 
Table 7 – Spearman’s rho Coefficient – Portugal 
 
We may see from in the sample of Portuguese banks that only the variables CLA-P and SIZE-P 
are statistically significant (p<α), with a moderate (53.2%) and positive association with the 
variable CLA-P and a weak (38.8%) and positive association with the variable SIZE-P, i.e., we 
may assume that there is an association between the disclosure index and the variables 
“number of classes of intangible assets” and bank size of the Portuguese banks. The 
dependent variable DIV38-P is explained about 28.3% by the variable CLA-P and 15% by the 
variable SIZE-P. The other variables are not statistically significant and it cannot be concluded 
that there is an association of these variables with the disclosure index of Portuguese banks. 
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 Since the data do not follow a normal distribution, we have used Spearman’s rho Correlation 
Coefficient. 
Table 8 – Spearman’s rho Coefficient – Spain 
The variable Spanish bank size (SIZE-S) is statistically significant for a level of significance of 
0.01, with a weak and negative variation. Thus, an increase in the dependent variable (DIV38-
S) is associated with a decrease in the variable size, which explains about 23.6% of the 
variation in the disclosure index of Spanish banks, being this variation in the opposite direction 
of the variation in the bank size. The other variables are not statistically significant in order to 
be associated with a variation in the disclosure index.  
The multiple linear regression is a statistical model used when a linear association is supposed 
to exist between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables. This statistical 
model seeks influences of the explanatory variables on the variable explained and not the 
causes that these variables produce (Pestana and Gageiro, 2005). Through the regression 
method, we complemented the analysis carried out in the correlations, trying to analyse a 
linear relationship, i.e., trying to explain the behaviour of the variable DIV38 according to the 
independent variables SIZE, PROF, PIBA, CLA, INT and PRIV. 
Multiple linear regression model 
 
When we introduced all the independent variables in the multiple linear regression model, the 
data obtained are those presented in the table below. 
Table 9 – Multiple linear regression 
 
The analysis of the previous table allow us to conclude that the variables obtained from the 
general model that are statistically significant are the variable SIZE and the variable INT, being 
the others without significant relationship with the dependent variable, because the value 
evidence associated with them is higher than the significance level of 0.5 (p>α). 
In the regression model, the correlation coefficient (R) is 67.8%, which means a moderate 
association between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) is 0.459, i.e., the variation in the disclosure index is influenced by the 
variables Bank size and internationalisation in 45.9%. 
From the results shown, we see that the disclosure index created increases as the 
internationalisation level decreases and the bank size increases. Therefore these results 
validate the hypothesis formulated that that the disclosure index is greater in larger banks 
(H1). This statement is verified by several studies on disclosure of intangible assets (Gómez, 
n/a; García-Meca and Martínez, 2005; Guthrie et. al., 2006; Oliveira et. al., 2006; White et. al., 
2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Li et. al., 2008; Gerpott et. al., 2008; Brüggen et. al., 2009). In 
the hypothesis formulated about the influence of the bank internationalisation level on the 
disclosure index (H5), although some conclusions were made about that influence, the 
direction of the variation is opposite, i.e. the disclosure index of intangible assets is lower in 
banks with great levels of internationalisation, which does not confirm the results of those 
studies about the positive association between both variables. This could mean that 
companies are more prone to disclose a greater amount of information when such information 
is limited to a smaller number of countries (corresponding to the companies included in the 
consolidation), that is, it may mean that, given the amount of information that the most 
internationalised companies will have to disclose, the information regarding intangible assets 
may be considered as being less relevant than the others. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we intended to analyse, through the content analysis technique, the consolidated 
accounts of 14 banks in the Iberian Peninsula, in order to verify if they reflect, in their disclosed 
accounts, the recognized importance of intangible assets in today’s economy and in the 
accounting doctrine. To do so, we have developed a disclosure index of intangible assets 
according to the requirements of IAS 38, built upon a dichotomic procedure basis applied to 
two observations: disclosure and application/relevance. Thus, value 1 is given if the bank 
discloses the issue in question and value 0 if the bank does not disclose it. In the same way 
value 1 is given if this information is relevant or applicable to the issue in question and value 0 
if the information is not relevant or applicable to the issue in question. The global index is 
obtained by the fraction of the items disclosed over the applicable items, resulting in a 
quantitative dependent variable whose values vary between 0 and 1. 
The statistical analysis allows us to verify that the average disclosure index of the banks 
examined is 0.96. An analysis of the considered determinants of the disclosure of intangible 
assets, allow us to recognise bank size and the property control as statistically significant 
determinants, i.e. determinants that have a significant influence on the disclosure index. 
The results obtained when the simple linear regression model was applied, confirm that the 
variable size is an explanatory variable, and that the variable internationalisation level is also 
considered significant. These two combined present an explanatory power of 45.9% of the 
variation in the disclosure index. Thus, larger banks are associated with a greater disclosure of 
the items required by IAS 38, and a greater disclosure of intangible assets is associated with a 
lower degree of bank internationalisation.  
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ANNEX 
SAMPLE 
Portuguese Banks Years
2006BCP
2007
N
1
BCP2
2009BCP4
2008BCP3
2006Montepio geral
2007
5
Montepio geral6
2009Montepio geral8
2008Montepio geral7
2006Finantia
2007
9
Finantia10
2009Finantia12
2008Finantia11
2006Caixa Geral de Depósitos
2007
13
14
200916
200815
Caixa Geral de Depósitos
Caixa Geral de Depósitos
BPI
2007
17
2009
19 2008
18 BPI
BPI
BPI
2007
20
2009
22
2008
21 BES
BES
BES
Caixa Geral de Depósitos
2006
BES
2006
24
23
2006
2008
25
2007
BANIF
BANIF
BANIF27
26
2009BANIF28
Spanish Banks Years
2006Sabadel
2007
N
29
Sabadel30
2009Sabadel32
2008Sabadel31
2006Santander
2007
33
Santander34
2009Santander36
2008Santander35
2006Popular
2007
37
Popular38
2009Popular40
2008Popular39
2006Caixanova
2007
41
42
200944
200843
Caixanova
Caixanova
BBVA
2007
45
2009
47 2008
46 BBVA
BBVA
BBVA
2007
48
2009
50
2008
49 Bankinter
Bankinter
Bankinter
Caixanova
2006
Bankinter
2006
52
51
2006
2008
53
2007
Banco Pastor
Banco Pastor
Banco Pastor55
54
2009Banco Pastor56
 
